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ELEVEN CASE STUDIES OF FAILURES IN GEOTECHNICAL ENGINEERING, 
ENGINEERING GEOLOGY, AND GEOPHYSICS: 
HOW THEY COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. 
 
David Cummings    Frank J. Kenton 
P.O. Box 3598     P.O. Box 940284 






When a failure occurs, geotechnical engineers, engineering geologists, and geophysicists assign its cause to an event that immediately 
precedes the failure, such as an earthquake, heavy rainfall, flood, or other natural event.  Assigning the failure to the immediate event 
is misplaced; the metastasis occurred because marginally stable conditions were allowed to exist through substandard investigations 
by the technical personnel, improper design, and inadequate review by the permitting agency. 
 
The fundamental cause of the failure is human error and is manifested in one or more of six categories.  (1) Before the investigation, 
during discussions with the client.  (2) During the investigation, by collecting inadequate, incomplete, or incorrect data; altering the 
field or test data to make them more favorable.  (3) After the investigation, when the inadequate data and invalid conclusions are 
incorporated in the final report.  (4) During the review process, when the reviewers accept the substandard report.  (5) After the 
agency approves the substandard report.  (6) After the agency grants the permit that allows construction to begin and after the work 
begins. 
 
Eleven case studies of failures are described including landslides, dam failures, floods, and ground subsidence.  Each case study 
identifies (1) the immediate event, (2) the fundamental cause, (3) how the inadequacies and deficiencies in one or more of the six 
categories contributed to the failure, and (4) how the failure could have been prevented. 
 
Each of these failures resulted in civil or criminal court action.  Depending on the facts in each case, penalties were imposed on the 





This paper describes a wide range of failures in which the 
owner/developer (client), technical consultants, reviewing and 
permitting agencies, and/or politicians worked in concert to 
allow the conditions that led to the failure.  It is important to 
recognize that almost all completed projects do not fail.  The 
most egregious failures get public attention. 
 
Failures occur because human errors allow marginally stable 
or unstable conditions to exist through:  (a) inadequate or 
improper technical investigations, (b) inadequate technical 
review by the permitting agency, (c) interference by the 
owner/developer (client), and/or (d) political interference to 
have the project approved even though the facts indicate the 
report is substandard and/or the site is unsuitable.  Technical 
professionals and permitting agencies blame the failure on an 
immediately preceding, natural event such as an earthquake, 
large amount of rainfall, landslide, or flood.  Such blame is 
misplaced; it is an attempt to shift the blame to a non-
human event. 
 
The fundamental (real) cause of failures is human failure.  In a 
proper investigation, naturally occurring events are known to 
exist, are anticipated, and are properly incorporated in the 
design.  Potential consequences of these events are mitigated 
and the failure does not occur. 
 
In the case studies described, we do not want to embarrass the 
technical consultants, the owner or developer, or the reviewing 
or permitting agency.  Therefore, the case studies do not 
identify the specific location or any of the participants.  The 
case studies are located in Iran, Italy, Pakistan, Turkey, and 
United States and are documented in public records of the 
court proceedings, permitting agencies, and Licensing Boards.  
 
The authors of this paper have provided expert witness 
testimony in court in the United States and in other countries.  
One of us (DC) provided testimony as a “Friend of the Court” 
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in twelve cases, including four of those described in this 
paper. 
 
Floods, earthquakes, and landslides occur naturally and when 
facilities or people are not affected, the public has little 
concern.  But, when they cause failures to buildings, etc., the 
public is concerned.  All of the failures to structures described 
in this paper could have been prevented through proper field 
investigation, design, and construction.  These three elements, 
had they been conducted and implemented honestly, would 
have anticipated and accommodated potential damage to the 
facilities from the natural events.  When such failures occur, 
litigation follows.  Engineers and geologists commonly use 
“standard of practice” or “standard of care” as a defense.  
Section 1.1 includes comments on standards of practice or 
care and are based on our experiences as expert witnesses and 
“Friend of the Court”. 
 
 
1.1. The Concept of Standard of Practice or Care 
 
When failures occur, many engineers and geologists who 
worked on the projects claim they applied the standard of 
practice or standard of care to the project and argue that they 
should not be blamed for the failure because they applied 
these “standards”.  Although the phrases “standard of 
practice” and “standard of care” may seem impressive, they 
are meaningless for several reasons. 
 
These “standards” are qualitative statements and are not sets 
of uniform criteria practiced uniformly everywhere; they differ 
from one jurisdiction to another.  Applying these “standards” 
are neither synonymous with nor a substitute for applying the 
highest quality of professional investigation.  The “standards” 
also should not be interpreted to be or confused with 
jurisdictional building codes.  Building codes are more formal 
documents that provide, for example, design criteria for high-
rise buildings, dams, and other critical structures.  As such, the 
codes are legal documents whereas the “standards” are not.  
Except for the Uniform Building Code (in the U.S.), local 
building codes differ between different jurisdictions and these 
local codes are not “standard”. 
 
In effect, the codes are minimum requirements and, in reality, 
only provide a framework for a design criterion.  For example, 
in aseismic design, the codes do not consider different 
damping that different structure may have.  The decision for 
assigning the appropriate level of damping is left to the 
judgment of the engineer.  The engineer or geologist who 
applies these minimum code requirements to every site, 
regardless of the adverse conditions that exist, is acting 
irresponsibly.  How many geologic and geotechnical failures 
have occurred after the site or facility “was built to code”?  
Importantly, nothing in the codes prevents the professional 
from applying a more rigorous or conservative investigation or 
design whenever the field conditions warrant. 
 
In the past, an engineer or geologist in a court case used the 
defense that he applied the “standard of practice”, “standard of 
care”, or that he “met the code” at the time the project was 
completed.  For at least 40 years, judges and juries have not 
accepted this argument as a valid defense.  (Judges try cases 
with respect to the “standard” or “code” that existed at the 
time to defendant investigated the site or designed the 
facility).  In several cases, the presiding judges admonished 
the engineer, geologist, and the defense attorney for using the 
specious defense of shifting the blame for the failures from the 
professional by implying that the “standards” and “codes” are 
the reason for the failures.  The judges clearly stated that the 
“standards” and “codes” are minimum guidelines at best, are 
inadequate to protect the public, and that engineers and 
geologists have a professional responsibility to protect the 
public.  One judge stated that those engineers and geologists 
who abdicate this responsibility are fundamentally dishonest.  
One judge asked an engineer, if the standards and codes that 
existed are so good and are definitive, why are they constantly 
being changed and made more rigorous?  The engineer had no 
answer. 
 
Judges, juries, and the public expect professionals to conduct 
their investigations thoroughly, competently, and proficiently.  
They expect the work to be done correctly and the 
recommendations are sufficiently conservative to prevent 
failures.  The primary responsibility of the engineers and 
geologists is protection of the public, regardless of other 
interests that may be promoted.  Some engineers and 
geologists have not acted in this way.  In Section 3.0, a case 
study is presented in which “other interests” were promoted to 
the detriment of protecting the public. 
 
Recently (AB269, 2002) The State of California enacted a law 
that states, in part, “…Protection of the public shall be the 
highest priority…Whenever the protection of the public is 
inconsistent with other interests sought to be promoted, the 
protection of the public is paramount.” 
 
 
2.0. FUNDAMENTAL VERSUS IMMEDIATE 
CAUSES OF FAILURES 
 
2.1. Before the Investigation 
Discussions begin between the client (owner/developer) and 
the technical consultants. The consultant reviews existing data 
and reports related to the site and from nearby areas.  A site-
specific work plan is prepared.  At this stage, potential 
geotechnical, geologic, and/or geophysical hazards are 
identified (e.g., earthquakes, floods, landslides, active faults).  
Staff is allocated, an estimate of time and cost is made, and the 
proposal submitted to the client. 
 
 
2.2. During the Investigation  
 
This category is where the most serious deficiencies develop.  
Quality assurance and quality control are rarely implemented 
and are not taken seriously.  Commonly, low-level staff is 
assigned to conduct the field work and laboratory tests.  These 
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people are the least qualified, least experienced, and least 
knowledgeable to do the work properly.  A senior staff 
member may check the work done by staff, but does not 
conduct detailed investigations for the purpose of identifying 
deficiencies in the work of the low-level staff.  Examples of 
the deficiencies are presented below. 
Both the client and the consultant have a vested interest in the 
report and the project.  Generally, discussions occur between 
the consultant and client to review the essence of the report 
before it is submitted to the reviewing and permitting agency.  
The client “recommended” changes be made to the report in 
order to make the report “more favorable” to the project. 
  
The staff geologist does not identify a thin clay layer that is a 
potential landslide plane, does not identify a bedding-plane 
fault, does not identify a fault as being active, or does not 
identify bedding or joint planes as potential flow paths for 
water. 
 
2.4. During the Review/Permitting Process 
 
The reviewers may or may not identify deficiencies in the 
report (e.g., incorrect data, calculations, geophysical 
equipment, improper geotechnical test, incorrect 
interpretations).  If, in the reviewer’s opinion, the report is 
acceptable, the report will be approved and a permit granted. 
 
The staff geophysicist chooses surface or borehole 
geophysical instruments that are not appropriate because the 
methods do not have sufficient resolution, depth penetration, 
do not measure the targeted properties.  He designs improper 
or insufficient survey line orientations or station spacing and 
does not use complementary methods to reduce the ambiguity 
(or enhance the reliability of) the methods.  Data are not 
reviewed in the field to identify “busts” resulting from 
instrumental causes or external sources (e.g., electric power 
lines, lightening); these errors are carried through the analyses 
and interpretations.  Another source of error is related to the 
software used to collect and reduce data and to calculate the 
results.  [One of us (DC) identified errors in two commonly 
used commercially available computers:  one for frequency 
domain EM and the other for transient EM surveys.  The 
developers denied the software contained errors; DC identified 
the locations of the errors in the programs, suggested 
corrections, and the developers made the corrections.  Of 
interest, the developers did not notify existing users of the 
software that contained the errors.] 
 
If deficiencies are identified, the reviewer may ask for 
clarification, corrections be made, additional tests be 
conducted, etc.  At this stage, the consultant will discuss the 
request with the client to decide the next step.  The client may 
not want to spend more money and time on additional work.  
The client may request the consultant to “modify” the report in 
order for it to be approved.  The consultant may or may not 
honor that request.  
 
The consultant may deny that errors exist.  The consultant may 
or may not conduct additional investigations.  The consultant 
may rewrite the report such that the errors are minimized, 
made to appear insignificant, and stating they are not an 
obstacle to a safe product.  A revised report is submitted to the 
agency and the agency may approve it.  If the consultant 
cannot satisfy the requirements of the agency, the client may 
enlist the aid of a politician to speak to the head of the 
permitting agency and “request” the report be approved and 
the permit granted. 
  
The staff engineer does not perform field tests adequately.  
Laboratory tests are conducted that may not be appropriate; 
samples may not be representative or, more importantly, may 
not be the rock type most likely to fail (i.e., the “weakest 
rock”).  Anomalous test results are discarded without 
assessing the reason for the anomaly.  (The reason for the 
anomaly may be unrecognized plane of weakness in the 
sample).  The equipment may not be calibrated to standards 
and the test results would have a bias. 
 
 
2.5. Acceptance of the Substandard Report 
 
The agency’s acceptance of the report allows the permit to be 
granted.  Grading begins at the site.  As soon as the 
consultant’s substandard report is accepted, the permitting 
agency becomes a knowing party to the errors and becomes a 
complicit party.  
 The measured values are reported as being accurate or precise, 
either explicitly or implicitly.  Such reporting is misleading 
and dishonest.  Unless the true value is known, the terms 
“accurate” and “precise” are meaningless; we never know the 
true value. 
2.5.1. The Key Role of the Permitting Agency.  The 
reviewing agency conducts a technical review of the report to 
determine if it (1) identifies hazards and how they would 
impact the final product (homes, etc.), (2) omits known 
hazards, (3) contains correct and sufficient data to support the 
conclusions, (4) contains conclusions that describe the impact 
of the project on the existing geologic conditions and 
processes at and near the site, and (5) contains assurance that 
the recommendations will mitigate any adverse geologic 
conditions and will result in a safe product (Larson, 1992). 
 
Field and laboratory data are assumed to be valid.  Maps and 
cross-sections are prepared, test data are tabulated, and 
stability calculations are made.  The information is assessed, 
interpreted, integrated, and conclusions are made.  A report is 
prepared and submitted to the client. 
  
 Completion of the proposed project results in a product that 
adds value for the public good and increases the tax base.  
Thus, there is a political and economic incentive to grant the 
2.3. After the Investigation  
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permit.  The agency that grants the permit certifies the site is 
safe for its proposed use.  In order to protect the public, the 
agency must remain honest, objective, and apolitical.  
Most, if not all failures, would be avoided if the personnel in 
the reviewing and permitting agency retained integrity in the 
review process. 
 
2.5.2. Agency Personnel.  The agency uses reviewers who 
are employed by the agency or are contract personnel.  Some 
agencies have employee reviewers who do not have a 
technical background, either through training, education, or 
experience.  Yet, they are asked to review and comment on 
technical reports.  These employees are civil servants and 
cannot be sued.  Reviewers may be contract technical 
professionals (engineers, geologists) who insist on a hold-
harmless clause in the contract that exempts them from 
culpability in a lawsuit.  In effect, the reviewers can accept 
substandard reports and not be held legally responsible for a 
future failure.  If the reviewers are honest in their review and 
recommend against granting a permit, they may be, and have 
been, overruled by the head of the agency. 
 
The technical personnel who review the reports are familiar 
with the geologic and geotechnical facts at the site.  Yet, they 
approve the false data and conclusions in the substandard 
reports.  By approving deficient, dishonest, and/or incomplete 
reports, the reviewers and the agencies become a knowing and 
complicit party in the deception. 
 
In most cases, litigation is the last recourse for those damaged 
after other attempts have been exhausted to resolve the 
damage caused by the failure.  Among the defendants is the 
governmental reviewing agency. 
 
 
2.6. After the Work Begins at the Site  
 
Geotechnical or geologic conditions may be identified that 
were not expected or may be different than those described in 
the report.  These conditions may be adverse to the project and 
(1) may be allowed to remain because the cost to repair the 
condition would be too high or (2) the adverse condition is 
opined to not pose a hazard to the safety of the project.  The 
project is allowed to continue as planned.  In addition, adverse 
conditions may not be identified.  If they are not identified, 
they cannot be corrected. 
 
 
3.0. A CASE STUDY THAT CONTAINS ALL SIX 
CATEGORIES 
 
This case study describes the events that led to several homes 
having been destroyed in the immediate vicinity of an active 
fault (Halper, 2002).  The current geotechnical consultant 
blames the homeowners for the distress to the homes by over-
watering their lawns.  The key participants in this study 
include the original owner/developer, subsequent developers, 
original geotechnical/geologic consultants, subsequent 




3.1. General Conditions at the Site 
 
Topography at the 3,300-acre site in Southern California 
consists of hilly terrain with jagged ridges and steep slopes; 
geology consists of folded and faulted sedimentary rocks.  
One of the faults shows evidence of recent fault displacement.  
Earthquakes have been instrumentally located along the fault, 
the two most recent were a ML=2.4 and 4.6 occurred on 
September 3, 2002.  Because of the recency of displacement 
and the presence of earthquakes along the fault, geologists 
classified it as being “active”.  The fault was designated by the 
State to be in the Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zone Act, 
before the initial site-specific investigations were made. 
 
 
3.2. Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zone Act 
 
In the 1970’s, a ML=6.4 earthquake occurred in Southern 
California; 65 people died and $500,000,000 in damage 
occurred.  As a result, the State Legislature passed the Alquist-
Priolo Special Studies Zone Act.  Its purpose was to protect 
the public by requiring detailed geologic studies be conducted 
at sites within an active fault zone and to prohibit construction 
of homes, schools, hospitals, office buildings, etc. over an 
active fault and within the fault zone.  It required a set-back of 
15 meters (m) on either side of an active fault or any of its 
branches.  The locations of the faults are published by the 
State (Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zone Maps); these maps 
are periodically up-dated. 
 
The first draft of the law included provisions for strict 
guidelines for investigations in areas of active faults and strict 
guidelines for assessing the safety of the site and facilities 
placed on the site.  The real estate interests objected to those 
strict guidelines; some geologists and engineers objected on 
the grounds that the law would expose them to lawsuits.  As a 
result, the strict provisions were removed.  The effect of 
removing the provisions allowed unsafe conditions to exist or 
not be reported. 
 
 
3.3. Geologic Investigations at the Subject Site  
 
The consultant hired by the original owner/developer 
identified the active fault and four active fault branches at the 
site and homes were built outside the 30-m set-back zone.  
The property was not completely developed and the vacant 
property was sold to another developer who hired a different 
consultant who also identified the active fault.  The developer 
removed that consultant and hired a geotechnical engineer 
who concluded that additional homes could safely be built; 
geologists advised against the construction and additional 
homes were built.  These home are now experiencing 
structural distress.  This developer sold the undeveloped 
property to a third developer. 
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3.4. City Personnel and the Reviewing/Permitting Agency  
 
The homeowners became upset.  They accused the city 
government of allowing the construction to proceed regardless 
of the geologic hazard.  They claimed a former Assistant City 
Manager was hired by the developer after leaving his City 
position and argued that such action is a violation of State 
lobbying laws.  In effect, the former employee acted as a 
representative for the developer.  In addition, the City 
Attorney who reviewed the approval process worked for the 
developer at a different real estate company.  Although the 
City Attorney informed the manager of his connection to the 
developer, the City Manager ruled that the City Attorney need 
not recuse himself.  Members of the City Council and the 
former mayor were not aware of this apparent conflict of 
interest and the City Attorney did not recuse himself. 
 
A critical element in protecting a potential home buyer is to 
give the buyer a document that factually discloses existing 
geologic hazards at or to the property.  During the original 
construction, the former Assistant City Manager asked the 
Planning Commission if the term “active earthquake zone” 
could be deleted from the disclosure documents that would be 
given to prospective home buyers.  His reason was that such a 
disclosure might frighten prospective buyers.  The 
Commission agreed to modify the “active earthquake zone” 
language and indicated that prospective home buyers could be 
told that they were moving into a “potentially active 
earthquake zone”.  [Author’s note:  A significant technical 
difference exists between “active earthquake zone” and a 
“potentially active earthquake zone”.]  The City Council 
approved the construction in the active earthquake zone and 
inserted the “potentially active” language in the disclosure 
documents. 
 




3.5. Lessons Learned  
 
All six categories are present in this case study.  Category 1 
exists because subsequent developers and their consultants 
attempted to circumvent the law.  Categories 2, 3 and 4 exist 
because the subsequent consultants claimed they did not see 
the active fault and related branches -- even though they 
existed, were identified by the original consultant, were shown 
on the State map, site maps, and described in reports.  The 
different opinions are not a matter of geologic interpretation!  
The subsequent consultants allowed homes to be built within 
the restricted set-back zones because the consultants chose not 
to recognize the active faults -- if an active fault does not exist, 
there is no set-back zone.  Category 5 exists because the 
permit process failed as a result of inadequate review of the 
reports, probable conflict of interest, deception by not 
disclosing material facts (not properly identifying the first 
geologic report and not properly defining the significance of 
the Alquist-Priolo Special Studies Zone Act to prospective 
home buyers).  Category 6 exists because the construction was 
allowed to proceed within the active fault zones.  Homes are 
currently being destroyed.  The only recourse for the 
homeowners is litigation. 
 
Unfortunately, it is not uncommon for unscrupulous 
developers to hire consultants who will provide a report that is 
favorable, regardless of facts of existing hazards.  It is even 
more unfortunate that consultants would provide such a report. 
 
 
4.0. TEN CASE STUDIES OF FAILURES 
 
The case studies described below are in the public record.  
They are separated into Geotechnical Engineering, 
Engineering Geology, and Geophysics based on the 
predominant discipline.  We will not identify the consultants 
because we do not want to further embarrass them.  For the 
same reason, we do not precisely locate the site of the 
investigation.  Quotation marks are direct quotations from 
reports, court proceedings, or Licensing Boards. 
 
 
4.1. Geotechnical Case Studies 
 
4.1.1.  A geotechnical engineer investigated a site for a 
housing tract that contained a known active fault.  Earth 
materials consisted of 3 m of alluvium overlying bedrock.  
The fault was shown on published maps, described in the open 
literature, and in reports of adjacent sites.  The engineer’s final 
report submitted to the permitting agency stated that “The 
fault was not exposed at ground surface and, therefore, did not 
exist at the site.”  He did not conduct trench studies.  The 
reviewing agency’s reply was that available information 
indicated the fault existed at the site and provided the 
consultant with published maps, reports of adjacent sites, and 
references to the consultant.  The agency recommended a 
trench be placed across the strike of the fault.  The engineer 
refused, stating that his investigation was conclusive.  The 
agency persisted and the engineer agreed only because the 
agency stated it would not approve the report without 
documentation that the fault either did or did not exist at the 
site. 
 
A 4-m deep trench was dug.  The trench walls were not 
supported with shoring.  The consultant’s staff engineer 
entered the trench, identified the fault in bedrock, and traced it 
through overlying alluvium to ground surface.  He began to 
photograph and map the fault when the trench collapsed and 
killed him.  Work stopped; the engineer did not complete the 
project. 
 
The initial investigation did not identify the fault because it 
was “not obvious at ground surface”, being covered by grass 
and bushes.  The engineer’s decision to not conduct 
subsurface investigations was not consistent with the standards 
of practice for active fault investigations.  The active fault was 
an existing adverse condition and posed a hazard.  The agency 
correctly requested additional work be done and refused to 
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grant a permit based on the information contained in the initial 
report. 
 
The death resulted in criminal action against the engineer.  At 
trial, the engineer blamed the collapse of the trench on 
“Evaporation of soil moisture; the surface tension of the pore 
water was reduced and no longer held the grains together.”  
That argument was dismissed by the court as being not 
relevant; the trench collapsed because it did not have shoring.  
In addition, the engineer violated Federal and State laws by 
not shoring the trench.  The court remanded the engineer’s 
technical report to the Licensing Board.  The Board’s action 
has not been made public. 
 
The permitting agency acted properly.  The engineer did not 
follow standard practice for (a) not investigating subsurface 
conditions of a known active fault and (b) not shoring the 
trench.  His argument that evaporation of soil moisture caused 
the trench to collapse was specious.  Had he followed Federal 
and State laws to shore the trench, the death would have been 
avoided. 
 
4.1.2.  A landslide occurred under a housing tract after several 
days of heavy rain.  The geotechnical report prepared for the 
developer and submitted to the permitting agency stated that 
the slope was stable and the site did not contain potential slide 
planes.  A building permit was granted based on the 
information in the report.  Following the landslide, a lawsuit 
was filed by the homeowners; both the engineer and 
permitting agency were named as defendants. 
 
A geotechnical engineer hired as an expert witness by the 
attorney representing the homeowners drilled several holes 
through the landslide, identified the basal slide plane and 
several overlying slide planes, all of bentonite.  All bentonite 
layers had adverse orientations and would daylight in the 
proposed cut slopes. 
 
During the trial, the engineer who worked for the developer 
blamed the failure on the rain, the related rise in ground water, 
and the increase in pore-water pressure.  Discovery for the 
trial identified boring logs from the investigation for 
development.  The logs revealed the presence of the same 
bentonite layers identified by the (plaintiff’s) attorney’s 
engineer.  Handwritten notes on the logs included the 
comment “These bentonite layers are not potential slide 
planes.  No need to test these materials.” and was followed by 
the initials of the developer’s engineer.  The values used in the 
stability calculations were those of a tested sandstone, with 
much higher values of cohesion and shear strength than those 
of bentonite.  Calculations were not made where the cut slopes 
excavated earth materials in the toe area of potential 
landslides. 
 
During the trial, the permitting agency claimed it never saw 
the logs or the handwritten notes; it granted the permit based 
on the data submitted.  However, the agency acknowledged it 
knew that bentonite layers were present in the area from its 
review of reports of adjacent sites.  For unknown reasons, the 
agency did not request the logs of the subject site.  In court, 
the developer’s engineer stated that bentonite layers were not 
potential slide planes.  The court’s appointed independent 
expert stated that the developer’s engineer’s statement was not 
consistent with the geologic conditions at the site and with the 
proposed construction of the cut slopes.  The court found that 
the instructions of the developer’s engineer’s to not test the 
materials was not consistent with standard professional 
practice. 
 
The court also found that the agency accepted a substandard 
report and should not have granted a permit.  It stated the 
agency should have requested the boring logs, given the fact 
that it had reports in its files and knowledge of surrounding 
sites. The agency should have requested calculations be made 
for those areas where the toe area of potential landslides were 
excavated. 
 
The engineer for the homeowners conducted tests on the 
bentonite and made stability calculations.  The calculations 
showed marginally stable conditions without water overlying 
the slide plane (FS=1.0) and unstable for 0.5 m of water above 
the slide plane (FS=0.95). 
 
The court found that the failure resulted because an unstable 
condition was allowed to exist because of inadequate site 
studies, inadequate testing, the engineer’s incorrect conclusion 
that bentonite was of no consequence to stability, absence of 
stability calculations for the areas where the toe of potential 
landslides, and others. 
 
The court found that the engineer’s decision not to test the 
bentonite was troubling.  The engineer knew of their adverse 
orientations based on the design and locations of the proposed 
cut slopes.  In court, the engineer was asked why he did not 
conduct stability calculations in the area of the cut slopes and 
in the toe of areas of potential landslides that would result in a 
withdrawal of lateral support.   His reply was that “The land 
was stable and there was no need to make those calculations.” 
 
The site was unstable before the rains and construction 
aggravated the condition.  The engineer’s actions were 
deemed by the court to be substandard.  He was ordered by the 
court to pay damages to the homeowners.  The engineer’s 
work was not sent to the State’s Licensing Board. 
 
4.1.3.  A landslide occurred under a housing tract after a 
ML=6.7 earthquake occurred and destroyed homes.  The 
geotechnical engineer who developed the site stated the 
slippage was “caused by the ground shaking and that the site 
did not contain slide planes.” 
 
Discovery during litigation revealed several potential slide 
planes with adverse orientations.  The report for development 
of the site that was submitted to the permitting agency 
contained stability calculations only for the static case.  The 
agency did not request calculations for the dynamic case.  
Discovery during trial revealed that calculations for the 
dynamic case were made by the engineer.  Handwritten notes 
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by the engineer, containing his initials, had the words 
“Destroy these notes!”  The calculations showed that for the 
dynamic case was, FS=0.90, well below the value acceptable 
to the permitting agency.  The agency granted the permit 
without having those calculations on the relative stability of 
the site subjected to earthquake shaking. 
 
The court concluded that the agency should not have granted 
the permit; granting a permit without calculations for the 
dynamic case was against the agency’s written policy.  The 
engineer knew of the adverse conditions and made no attempt 
to mitigate them.  With respect to the stability calculations for 
the dynamic condition, he provided instructions to “Destroy 
these notes!”.  The court found that the engineer’s instructions 
to “Destroy these notes!” was an attempt to deceive.  In effect, 
he submitted a report that was not factual and was 
professionally dishonest.  The court concluded that the 
engineer “…purposely and willfully acted to deceive…in 
order to have the site appear stable.” 
 
The court submitted the engineer’s report to the Licensing 
Board.  The Board’s conclusions were that the engineer 
“Purposely withheld information not favorable to the client, 
attempted to destroy evidence, and was negligent in 
conducting his professional activities.”  A monetary fine was 
imposed. 
 
4.1.4.  An earth dam was built in a canyon to prevent 
floodwater from entering a community downstream.  Five 
years later, the dam failed after a series of heavy rains.  Water 
accumulated behind the dam, flowed over the dam, eroded a 
“V-slot” in the dam that widened and deepened through 
erosion, and the dam broke.  Flood waters flowed into the 
community downstream, killed 3 people and 500 livestock, 
resulted in $25,000,000 in damages to commercial and 
residential buildings, a school, a firehouse, a police station, 
utilities, roads, and railroad tracks.  Commerce was disrupted 
for four weeks.  The engineer blamed the failure on the rains. 
 
The community was flooded several times previously; a 
decision was made to build a dam.  The contract between the 
engineer and the City Council was to design a dam and 
included the instruction that the dam was “…to prevent the 
community from future floods and crippling economic losses.”  
The engineer used the “design storm” to determine the height 
of the dam, and referenced the book “Hydrology for 
Engineers” (Linsley, Kohler, and Paulhaus, 1975, McGraw 
Hill, 2nd ed.).  Litigation followed the disaster. 
 
Discovery during the trial indicated the proposal and contract 
were not subject to competitive bids, but was sole source to 
the engineer.  During the trial, it was revealed that the 
engineer was chosen because he was a relative of a member of 
the City Council.  The report, calculations, and 
recommendations were accepted by the City Council without 
independent technical review. 
 
The court found that the engineer did not have the knowledge, 
experience, or technical qualifications to design dams or flood 
control structures, either by education or experience, and that 
the decision to choose the engineer by nepotism was 
inappropriate.  The court found that the engineer’s design 
criterion was not appropriate.  The same reference used by the 
engineer cautioned against the general acceptance of the 
“design storm” as the only criterion for design of the dam:  
“The design storm, even if the frequency is known accurately, 
is inadequate for economic analysis which should be made for 
flood mitigation…” (p. 360).  During the trial, the engineer 
stated he used this design “Because it was described in 
standard text and I relied on that reference.” 
 
The court appointed expert stated that a professional review of 
the proposed design prior to construction would have 
identified the deficiency.  A different design would have been 
proposed, one that would have been appropriate for the 
purpose of the dam and the failure would have been avoided.  
She stated “The dam was located in a canyon with steep walls 
and the engineer’s design height of the dam was too low.  My 
calculations for design would have resulted in a dam that was 
75 m higher, and the walls of the canyon above (her design) 
height would still be another 150 m.” 
 
The engineer was instructed by the court to pay for damages.  
His work was submitted to the State Licensing Board and his 
license revoked.  A separate criminal trial followed because of 
the death of three people. 
 
 
4.2. Engineering Geologic Case Studies 
 
4.2.1.  A geologist conducted hydrologic tests at a site to 
assess its suitability as an underground liquid toxic waste 
disposal system.  Investigations indicated that the rocks 
contained three sets of fractures.  One prominent set, with 
open fractures (≤ 0.5 cm), was orientated such that fluids 
would flow downgradient, toward a livestock ranch.  Based on 
percolation tests and analyses of transmissivity, the 
contaminants would be expected to reach the ranch about two 
years after injection.  The geologist concluded the site was not 
suitable for the disposal system and recommended that the 
site not be used. 
 
About a year later, the geologist was asked by the same client 
to conduct additional percolation tests and analyses at the 
same site.  The results of these studies were different than 
those of the previous study.  He concluded that the site is 
suitable.  Based on his report, a permit was granted to proceed 
with the design and construction of the disposal plant and 
system.  Two years after the toxic liquid waste was injected, 
toxic materials were identified in water wells at the ranch.  
Litigation followed. 
 
The plant operator and the geologist were named in the suit.  
In court, the geologist stated that his second set of tests and 
analyses were correct and blamed the operator of the plant 
because he “…used too much pressure in injecting the toxic 
liquid waste.”  The operator denied that allegation. 
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The court appointed expert stated that “Both sets of tests were 
conducted in the same area.  The first set of tests and analyses 
were more rigorous and were conducted using appropriate 
methods and analyses.  The later tests and the analyses were 
substandard because they did not comply with standard 
practice and with local ordinances.”  The values of 
transmissivity used in the later study included values of 
hydraulic properties different than those in the earlier study; 
the previous values were based on laboratory tests whereas the 
later values were not. 
 
The court appointed expert conducted field tests and analyses 
that confirmed the results of the earlier study.  He testified the 
argument used by the geologist that “…the operator used too 
much pressure in injecting the liquid waste…” was not correct 
and that “…the liquid was put underground by pouring it into 
the casing installed in the disposal wells, allowing the liquid to 
fall by gravity and flow out through perforations in the 
casing.” 
 
During discovery, minutes of a meeting between the geologist 
and the operator indicated the operator told the geologist “…to 
determine that the site could be used for liquid waste 
disposal.”  After that meeting, the second set of tests and 
analyses were conducted. 
 
The court determined “…that a collusive act occurred and an 
attempt was made to deceive the permitting agency.”  The 
court dismissed the geologist’s argument of excess pumping 
pressure and admonished him of trying to shift the entire 
blame to the operator of the plant.”  The court instructed the 
geologist and plant operator “…to pay for all damages 
incurred to the ranch and to extract the toxic liquid from the 
groundwater.”  The court ordered the Licensing Board to 
revoke the license of the geologist. 
 
The toxic waste contamination would have been avoided if the 
geologist had been honest, relied on his original tests, and not 
engaged in collusion to deceive.  The permitting agency 
accepted the conclusions of the report, but did not question its 
validity by conducting a more rigorous technical review. 
 
4.2.2.  A geologist was hired to determine the cause of 
extensive fracturing in soil, in walls and foundations of homes, 
and in other hardscape at a housing tract.  The geologist was 
the same one who conducted the geologic investigation for 
development of the tract. 
 
He conducted a two-year field geologic program.  He mapped 
the area every month during the spring, summer, and fall; field 
work was not done during the winter because snow covered 
the ground.  His detailed studies included:  mapping the areal 
distribution of fractures; mapping zones of fractures and 
individual fractures within each zone; defining orientation, 
width, concentration, and spacing between individual fractures 
and the fracture zones.  He prepared topographic maps 
(C.I.=0.3 m) each month, updated the fracture and topographic 
maps every month, and compared the updated data and maps 
with previous sets.  The homeowners received semi-annual 
reports.  The final report stated that “The fractures in the soil 
were related to expansion and contraction of expansive soil.  
Distress to the foundations and walls of the homes were in 
response to the expansive soil.  There was no cause for alarm.”  
He concluded “…the fractures in the soil were natural and not 
the cause of distress to the homes, either directly or 
indirectly.” 
 
A year later, the homeowners complained that the cracks were 
getting larger, the ground was sinking, and 3 houses were 
tilting.  The geologist restated his earlier conclusion.  Six 
months later and during a period of two hours, the 3 houses 
tilted further and dropped into a linear depression, 100 m x 
1000 m in area and 4 m deep.  The geologist, in a report to the 
homeowners, stated that the “…depression was a result of 
excess watering of the lawns by the homeowners and that the 
excess water resulted in underground piping of the soils.”  
Litigation followed. 
 
Discovery during trial showed that the houses were built over 
an abandoned, near-surface coal mine.  Maps on file with the 
State Mining Commission showed the locations of the rooms, 
pillars, their lengths and widths, and the thickness of overlying 
rocks to ground surface.  Direct correlations existed:  (1) the 3 
homes that collapsed were located over one of the mine’s 
rooms, (2) the locations and orientations of the ground cracks 
were over and parallel to the length of the rooms, (3) the 
topographic depressions mapped at ground surface were 
located over the rooms, (4) the areas of maximum depression 
shown on the geologist’s topographic maps were located over 
the center of rooms, and (5) the areas at ground surface over 
the pillars had the fewest fractures. 
 
The court found that “The distress to the homes was directly 
related to subsidence of the ground over the abandoned mine.”  
The court rebuked the geologist “…for not disclosing the fact 
that he worked at that mine as chief geologist, that he knew 
the maps of the mine existed at the State Mining Commission, 
and failed to reveal their existence.”  The court found that he 
“…probably recognized the correlation between the fracture 
pattern at ground surface and the locations and orientation of 
the mined rooms, and that he purposely provided a misleading 
interpretation of the cause of the fractures.”  The judge 
ordered the geologist “…to pay for all damages incurred by 
the homeowners related to the subsidence.” and “…to 
reimburse any homeowner for future structural damages that 
may result during the next 10 years related to subsidence.”  
The court ordered the geologist to reimburse all homeowners 
for loss of property value. 
 
The court found that the geologist was negligent and acted 
fraudulently in not informing the developer of the existence of 
the abandoned mine under the property and the related 
potential for subsidence when he (the geologist) conducted the 
initial study for the housing tract.  The geologist was also 
aware of subsidence over the mine in areas elsewhere.  The 
court referred the matter to the State Licensing Board, and 
recommended that “…the geologist’s license be revoked.”  
The Board acted to revoke the license. 
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The damage to the homes could have been avoided by 
preventing development at the site. 
 
4.2.3.  A geologist investigated a site at the base of a hill to 
assess the site’s suitability for several school buildings.  The 
investigation included surface geologic mapping, and 
subsurface investigations (borings, trenches). 
 
The site was located on an alluvial plain with a gentle slope.  
Near-surface materials under the site were composed of 
alluvial cobbles, pebbles, sand, silt, and clay.  One edge of the 
site was at the base of a hill.  Rocks in the hill consisted of 
interbedded sandstone, siltstone, and shale.  A river was 
located at the edge of the alluvial plain, 2 kilometers (km) 
from the site. 
 
Borings in the alluvium indicated its thickness was 1 m at the 
base of the hill and increased to 30 m at the edge of the site, a 
horizontal distance of 1.0 km.  Groundwater was not present 
in the alluvium under the site.  Trench investigations indicated 
a thin soil cover of weathered alluvial materials over lenses of 
alluvium.  Liquefaction potential was considered highly 
unlikely, based on the level of expected seismic shaking at the 
site.  One trench crossed the boundary between the alluvium 
and the rocks of the hill.  Orientations of the bedding planes in 
the rocks were into the hill.  Drilling on the hill was not done. 
 
A report was submitted to the permitting agency, a permit was 
granted and the school was built.  The engineer for the school 
district located one of the school buildings a few meters from 
the base of the hill.  The base of the hill was not excavated; its 
original slope was maintained.  On the hill and behind the 
building, fences were placed at different elevations to prevent 
rocks from rolling down and damaging he building.  Diversion 
channels were built to divert surface water runoff and debris 
flows away from the building.  A retaining wall (3.0 m high) 
was placed at the base of the hill and behind the building as 
added protection. 
 
Eight years after the building was completed, a series of heavy 
rains occurred.  The school site was not flooded from overflow 
of the river’s banks.  Rocks dislodged along the hillslope were 
caught by the fences and the 3 m  wall.  Debris flows and 
surface water runoff were diverted away from the building. 
 
Two months later, cracks appeared in the retaining wall 
behind the building; rocks and debris that accumulated behind 
the wall were removed.  Several weeks later, the retaining wall 
bowed away from the hillside and toward the building.  
During the next several weeks, the distress to the wall 
increased and the bend in the wall became more pronounced.  
The accumulated debris behind the wall was removed.  The 
geologist was called to the site.  He examined the wall and 
interpreted the distress to be a result of “…a combination of 
the weakening of the wall’s footing by the rain water and to 
settlement of the alluvium under the footing.” 
 
A week later, the lower part of the hill moved against the 
school building, breaking its outer wall in several places.  A 
landslide occurred.  At the first indication of distress to the 
building, everyone was evacuated.  Signs were posted to 
prohibit occupancy.  Within a week, movement of the hillside 
destroyed the building. 
 
Subsequent investigation of the landslide indicated that the 
current movement was a reactivation of an ancient landslide.  
Site studies included borings on the hill; the slide mass moved 
on a soft shale layer.  The dips of the rocks were oriented 
toward the face of the slope (adverse), not into the hill as 
observed in the trench at the base of the hill.  The dip into the 
hill at the slope’s base was interpreted as the change in dip of 
the rocks at the toe of the ancient landslide.  Litigation 
followed. 
 
In court, the geologist blamed the landslide on the water 
seeping into the hill from the heavy rains. 
 
The court found and all parties agreed that “…the design of 
the fences, diversion channels, and retaining wall functioned 
properly.”  The court found that the initial investigations were 
substandard and should have included borings higher on the 
hill; the ancient landslide probably would have been 
identified. 
 
The court appointed expert (geologist) stated that “Given the 
site’s geology, reactivation of the ancient landslide probably 
would have occurred anyway.  Construction at the school site 
did not contribute to the failure because there was no 
disturbance of the slope that would have lowered the factor of 
safety.  “To have constructed a buttress at the base of the hill 
would not have been effective in preventing the landslide from 
being reactivated; the landslide was too large.  Had the 
landslide been identified during the initial study, the building 
would have been located farther from the base of the hill.  
Construction of an engineered buttress or other structure 
would not have been effective in preventing the landslide from 
being reactivated; the landslide was too massive.” 
 
The geologist was ordered to pay damages.  The State did not 
have a Licensing Board. 
 
 
4.3. Geophysical Case Studies 
  
4.3.1. Up-Hole Shear Wave Survey to Determine 
Characteristic Site Period.  A 10-story building was proposed 
to house a medical facility.  The proposed foundation was to 
be a reinforced concrete slab, resting on compacted alluvial 
materials.   Geologic conditions under the building site 
included 10 m of alluvium (interbedded gravel, sand, silt, and 
clay) overlying bedrock (sandstone). 
 
The geotechnical engineer decided that geologic investigations 
were not required.  Because the region experienced large 
magnitude earthquakes and the building should be constructed 
to withstand strong ground motion, the engineer decided to 
conduct an up-hole shear wave investigation and calculate the 
Characteristic Site Period.  A 17 m boring encountered 
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alluvium (15 m), bedrock (sandstone, 2 m), and 2 m of water 
in the alluvium above the alluvium/bedrock contact.  The 
engineer conducted one up-hole shear wave survey; 
measurements were made at ½-m intervals.  Measurements 
were made in 2 m of bedrock and only in 1 m of the overlying 
saturated alluvium.  The Characteristic Site Period was 
calculated using these data.  A report was submitted to the 
reviewing agency.  The report did not include a ground 
response spectra for the site. 
 
The reviewing agency questioned the absence of a ground 
response spectra, validity of up-hole survey, and the calculated 
Site Period.  It requested additional shear-wave data be 
collected throughout the thickness of the alluvial section and 
the Site Period be recalculated, as well as a ground response 
spectra. 
 
In his response, the engineer stated that additional up-hole 
surveys in the alluvium were not necessary because (1) the 
Characteristic Site Period refers only to bedrock, citing one of 
his previous reports as a definitive reference, (2) alluvium 
dampens seismic waves as they pass through it, and (3) 
alluvium provides a better foundation than rocks.  He refused 
to prepare a ground response spectra because “The area had 
not experienced a major earthquake in the last 20 years and 
there was not need for a spectra.”  The agency denied approval 
and denied the permit. 
 
The engineer discussed the denial of both the report and the 
permit with the client.  The client enlisted the Mayor of the 
City to have the report approved.  The mayor discussed the 
report with the agency’s chief.  Three days later, the permit 
was granted.  The architect questioned the validity of the 
Characteristic Site Period and the absence of a ground 
response spectra; he refused to design the building using the 
information provided.  The owner hired a different architect 
who accepted the report and prepared a design. 
 
The hospital was built.  Eight years later, an earthquake 
(ML=6.8) occurred.  The ground shaking at the site caused 
extensive damage.  The top 4 stories collapsed and two outside 
walls fell away from the frame, resulting in 22 deaths and 117 
injuries.  A lawsuit followed. 
 
The court found that the agency was in error by approving the 
consultant’s substandard report, granting the permit, and 
accepting the architect’s design of the building.  The court 
found that the engineer erred in his up-hole shear wave survey 
and calculations; that the engineer did not understand how 
seismic waves are transmitted from the bedrock through 
alluvium, that alluvium does not dampen the seismic waves, 
and the absence of a ground response spectra.  The court 
submitted both the engineer’s report and the architect’s design 
to the respective Boards.  Both Boards revoked the respective 
licenses. 
 
Because deaths occurred, criminal action was taken against the 
engineer, the architect, and the owner.  All were found guilty 
of having contributed to the deaths.  The laws of the country 
provided that the guilty be imprisoned. 
 
The failure could have been prevented if a geophysicist 
conducted several proper up-hole shear wave surveys across 
the site, including several under the proposed location for the 
building.  Calculations of the Characteristic Site Period would 
be done for all survey locations.  Preparation of a ground 
response spectra would have aided aseismic design.  The court 
also stated that a conservative aseismic design for the building 
certainly would have been appropriate, especially because it is 
a hospital. 
 
4.3.2. Gravimetric Survey to Locate Cavities in Limestone.  
A housing tract was proposed at a 2 km x 2 km area of known 
karst topography.  The owner wanted to locate the homes in 
areas that would not be subject to distress caused by 
subsidence or collapse into solution cavities.  The engineer’s 
design criterion was to avoid cavities (1) with areal extent of 
50 m x 50 m and located within 50 m of ground surface.  The 
engineer knew that his previous work at and near the site 
identified sinkholes in the general area and cavities under the 
site; the cavities had diameters as large as 200 m x 300 m in 
area and at depths of 25 m.  Initially, a drilling program was 
proposed to locate the cavities but it was discounted because 
of the cost and the high probability that cavities would not be 
intersected. 
 
The engineer conducted a risk analysis and concluded that any 
cavities under the site would not pose a hazard within the life 
expectancy of the homes.  The engineer recommended a 
geophysical survey be conducted to provide data of sufficient 
detail to meet the engineer’s design criterion.  The survey lines 
were to be oriented north-south and spaced 50 m apart, station 
spacing along the lines were to be 50 m apart. 
 
Eight proposals were submitted from geophysicists.  Each 
proposed a single method:  either electrical resistivity, seismic 
refraction, gravimetric, frequency domain electromagnetic, or 
transient electromagnetic. 
 
The engineer chose the gravimetric method.  To keep costs 
low, the engineer decided that he would conduct the survey 
and he changed the original proposed survey grid to survey 
lines separated by 400 m with station spacing at 75 m. 
 
A map was prepared of the completed survey; it showed 
several geophysical anomalies, interpreted as cavities.  Cross-
sections were prepared that showed the shape and depths of 
the cavities.  Two cavities of the specified size were within the 
50 m depth criterion.  The engineer allowed a surface set-back 
of 75 m x 75 m over the geophysical anomalies.  The tract was 
built based only on the results of the geophysical survey. 
 
Twelve years after the homes were built, the area experienced 
2 years of unusually heavy rains.  About a year later, 28 
homes experienced distress and 11 homes collapsed into 
sinkholes.  The collapsed and distressed homes were aligned 
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along 3 separate trends, each oriented N30E.  Litigation 
followed. 
 
In court, the engineer argued that the collapse and distress 
were the result of the recent rains.  The court found that the 
engineer relied on his geophysical survey to locate the 
cavities.  Based on expert testimony from several renowned 
geophysicists, the changes made by the engineer to the initial 
survey design could not have provided sufficient resolution to 
identify (1) individual cavities with diameters of 50 m x 50 m, 
(2) depth of the cavities, (3) areal shape of the cavities, and (4) 
their areal extent under the tract. 
 
The court found that the potential for collapse existed prior to 
the rains because the cavities existed under the homes prior to 
the rains.  Similar heavy rains and the rise in groundwater 
occurred twice during the 12 years since the homes were built 
and failures did not occur.  Importantly, the survey design 
would not have been able to distinguish a small anomaly 
caused by a small cavity under the survey station or a large 
cavity that existed outside the survey station but part of the 
cavity extended under the station.  The court found that 
prudent engineering practice would include drilling at least 
one hole, at least 50 m deep, at each home site.  Drilling was 
not done anywhere at the site. 
 
The court found for the plaintiffs and awarded monetary 
damages.  The court recommended that the Engineer’s 
Licensing Board review the engineer’s past practice.  The 
Board found that its files contained several previous 
complaints against the engineer related to different projects.  It 
also found that the engineer had, in his files, maps and reports 
that indicated solution cavities occurred along a joint set 
oriented N30E.  The Board used two geophysicists to review 
the geophysical surveys and both agreed, independently, that 
the geophysical survey conducted by the engineer was 
substandard.  They stated that the survey lines should have 
been oriented perpendicular to the N30E trend, spaced 25 m 
apart with station spacing 25 m apart along each line.  They 
both agreed that a gravimetric survey probably would not be 
the best method to use for the purpose of the survey.  The 
Board levied a fine against the engineer and stipulated that he 
cease conducting geophysical surveys. 
 
Although the subsidence probably could not have been 
prevented, the homes need not have been damaged.  They 
would not have been located over the cavities.  A drilling 
program of several borings, each 75 m deep, under each home 
site would have minimized the probability of placing a home 
over a cavity. 
 
4.3.3. Temperature Surveys in an Earth Dam to Monitor the 
Flow of Water through Fractures in the Dam.  Visual 
inspection along the base of a concrete dam revealed three sets 
of near-vertical fractures.  The three sets were approximately 7 
m apart.  One set contained 20 fractures, the second set 
contained 35 fractures, and the third set contained 60 fractures.  
The length of fractures ranged from 5 cm to 20 cm.  Widths 
ranged up to 0.25 cm.  Spacing between the fractures within 
each set ranged from 2 cm to 5 cm.  Water was not observed 
seeping through the fractures in the dam. 
 
A request was made for proposal to geophysically monitor the 
flow of water through the fractures.  Responses included 
several methods:  electrical resistivity, frequency domain 
electromagnetic, and temperature.  The temperature survey 
was chosen and the geophysicist was a professor at a local 
university. 
 
Data from the geophysical survey were to be used as an early 
warning system.  If the survey indicated a pattern of increased 
water flow, then a decision would be made to open the gates 
and drain the water in a controlled manner to avoid a flood 
should the dam fail.  Thermistors were installed.  After a 
baseline survey, the thermistors were monitored on a weekly 
basis to determine if changes occurred.  Each set of weekly 
measurements was compared to the baseline and to preceding 
weekly measurements. 
 
Physical changes in the fractures were monitored on a daily 
basis by the operator of the dam.  Individual fractures were 
measured.  Changes were measured in length and width of 
individual fractures, spacing between fractures, number of 
fractures in each set, and whether fractures were developing 
elsewhere in the dam. 
 
Weekly meetings were held; both sets of data (temperature 
measurements and physical observations) were compared and 
were discussed.  After two months, the physical measurements 
showed that the fractures were getting noticeably longer and 
wider, that new fractures were developing, and that water was 
observed seeping through the fractures.  The values of the 
thermal measurements remained constant—the same value as 
the baseline measurement. 
 
Three months later, the 3 separate fracture sets merged to 
become one large set and the length of individual fractures 
grew to about 1 m and widths ranged to up to 1 cm.  Water 
flowed from the cracks at a rate of 5 liters/hour.  The values of 
the temperature remained as they were at the time of the 
baseline measurement. 
 
An emergency meeting was called by the dam’s operator.  The 
minutes of the meeting indicated the geophysicist stated (1) 
the temperature data were more reliable than the physical 
(observed) measurements, (2) the data did not show 
temperature changes and, therefore, the dam was not leaking, 
(3) the source of the water coming through the dam was not 
coming from behind the dam (but did not offer an explanation 
for the source of the water), (4) that 5 liters/hour was not 
significant and even 1 liter/hour would not be significant, and 
(5) stated, emphatically, that the integrity of the dam was not 
being compromised by the fractures. 
 
The operator expressed concern that the dam might fail and 
ordered the spillways be opened to allow the water level 
behind the dam to be lowered to 20% capacity.  The 
geophysicist became upset because he was not consulted and 
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continued to insist that the integrity of the dam was solid.  He 
wrote a letter to the Governor of the State indicating that he 
was an expert in geophysics, that he was an expert in dam 
safety, and that the operator acted irresponsibly by lowering 
the water. 
 
About a week later, an earthquake (ML=5.6) occurred in the 
general area.  Three months later, the dam failed and the 
stored water (at the level of 20% capacity) flowed 
downstream.  Damage caused by the floodwater was minimal, 
restricted to minor overflow of the drainage channel.  Several 
buildings along the banks experienced minor flooding.  
Litigation followed. 
 
The court found that the operator acted properly in lowering 
the water in the dam; the operator’s decision was based on the 
physical measurements.  Insurance covered the claims. 
 
In court, the geophysicist argued that a fault existed under the 
dam and the earthquake caused the dam to fail.  Court 
appointed expert witnesses presented facts that (1) a fault did 
not exist under the dam, (2) based on inspections by dam 
safety experts immediately after the earthquake, the dam did 
not fail and retained its integrity after the earthquake, and (3) 
the level of earthquake ground shaking at the site would not 
have been sufficient to cause failure. 
 
The court found that the geophysical method did not meet the 
objectives of the contract:  (1) to determine changes in flow of 
water through the dam and (2) to act as an early warning 
system.  During discovery, the court found that the thermistors 
were not sufficiently sensitive to detect changes in 
temperature related to flowing water.  Discovery also revealed 
that the geophysicist knew of these deficiencies.  The court 
also found, during examination at trial, that the geophysicist 
(1) did not understand the physics of temperature in a flowing 
liquid, (2) how the temperature would be dampened by contact 
with the concrete in the dam, and (3) the limitations of the 
method. 
 
The university professor (geophysicist) did not have a license 
to practice.  The only Licensing Board for the State was for 
Engineers; the geophysicist did not qualify as an engineer, by 
either education, training, or experience.  The judge ruled that 
(1) the geophysicist was not competent to practice geophysics, 
(2) the geophysicist did not know of the limitations of the 
method and falsely represented the value of the method to the 
client, (3) the geophysicist’s letter to the Governor was a 
blatant attempt to identify himself as an expert in dam safety, 
and (4) ordered the geophysicist never to consult.  The 
geophysicist appealed the court’s decision; the Appellate 
Court stayed the decision.  The court ordered the geophysicist 
to reimburse the operator of the dam for all costs related to (1) 
the geophysical surveys and related reports and (2) time 
charged for meetings.  The court ordered the geophysicist to 
reimburse the insurance company for its costs. 
 
A catastrophic dam failure and flood was avoided by the 
action of the operator to lower the water.  But for the 
insistence by the geophysicist that his method was working 
properly, the water behind the dam probably would have been 





Failures are not caused by natural events (earthquake, flood, 
landslide, and others) that immediately precede a failure.  
Failures are caused by human errors that allow marginally 
stable or unstable conditions to exist through substandard 
investigations, dishonesty and deceit, approval of 
substandard reports by reviewing agencies, and political 






California Assembly Bill 269, 2002.  Requirements of this bill 
apply to architecture, professional engineers, geologists and 
geophysicists, contractors and other licensed professionals.  
This bill applies to licensing boards, commissions and 
bureaus. 
 
Larson, R. A., 1992, A Philosophy of Regulatory Review., 
Assoc. Engin. Geology, Proc. 35th Ann. Mtg. p. 224-226. 
 
Halper, E., 2002, Fault Lines in Law Leave Homes on Shaky 
Ground. p. A22-A23. Los Angeles Times, August 11, 2002. 
 
Ten of the eleven case studies are taken from court records; all 
are in the public domain and available for review.  Four of the 
court proceedings are from Iran, Italy, Pakistan, and Turkey.  
Six are from the United States:  2 in California; 1 in Colorado; 
1 in Florida; 1 in Tennessee, and 1 in Virginia.  The eleventh 
case study is in California and is the one described by Halper 
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